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The idea of economic mobility in America often evokes a personal story.  Formany Americans, it is one of immigrant parents or grandparents, or evenone’s own journey and arrival. In recent decades, immigration has been 
rising steadily, with nearly one million legal immigrants entering the country per
year throughout the 1990s and in the early years of this century, compared to 
only about 300,000 per year in the 1960s. In addition to legal immigrants, it is
estimated that about 500,000 illegal immigrants now arrive each year. 
These numbers clearly show that the allure of the American Dream is alive 
and well. But is it actually working for today’s immigrants? How has immigrant
economic mobility changed over time? And is immigrant economic mobility 
similar to that of U.S. citizens? 
This report explains that the American engine of economic assimilation continues
to be a powerful force, but the engine is incorporating a fundamentally different
and larger pool of immigrants than it did in earlier generations. The shifting 
educational and economic profile of today’s immigrants is provoking difficult 
and important questions about the economic prospects for immigrants in 
America today.1
In the post-war period, immigrants have experienced strong upward
economic mobility between generations.
Immigrants continue to realize significant gains in upward mobility between the
first and second generation, although those gains have narrowed for the latest 
generation.
l A comparison of first generation immigrants in 1970 and second generation 
immigrants in 2000 reveals that average wages increased by 5 percentage 
points relative to non-immigrant wages.  Between 1940 and 1970, there was 
an increase of nearly 9 percentage points. In both cases, second generation 
immigrants continue to have higher wages than non-immigrants.
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1 The data presented here are based on analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey that includes both legal and
illegal immigrants in the sample. However, the survey does not allow researchers to identify the legal status of immigrants and
therefore cannot be used to analyze legal versus illegal immigrants. 
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Wages of first and second generation immigrants have been declining
over the last 60 years, relative to non-immigrant Americans.
Today, first generation immigrants are earning less compared to non-immigrant 
Americans than they have at any other time since World War II; and there has 
been a sharp decline in the last 30 years.
l In 2000, first generation immigrants earned 20 percent less than the typical 
non-immigrant worker, compared to 1970, when recent arrivals were still 
earning 1.4 percent more than their non-immigrant counterparts. In 1940, 
new immigrants were earning almost 6 percent more than non-immigrant 
workers.
l The impact of low-wage immigrants on wages of non-immigrant workers is 
the subject of active and unresolved debate. 
Second generation immigrant workers continue to earn higher wages than 
non-immigrant workers, though that difference has narrowed as well. 
l In 2000, second generation immigrants made 6.3 percent more than 
non-immigrant workers, compared to 14.6 percent more in 1970, and 
17.8 percent more in 1940.
In one generation, the American economy tends to moderate differences
in first generation immigrant income, based on country of origin.
Upon first arriving in the United States, first generation immigrants from 
industrialized nations tend to earn more than average non-immigrant workers, 
while immigrants from non-industrialized nations tend to earn less. 
But by the second generation, wages for the vast majority of immigrants from 
both industrialized and non-industrialized nations move toward average 
non-immigrant wages. 
l Second generation immigrants from industrialized nations are more likely to 
experience decreases in wages relative to average non-immigrant wages, while 
second generation immigrants from non-industrialized nations are more likely
to experience increases in wages relative to U.S. averages.
> For example, in the case of Mexico, relative earnings moved from 
32 percent less than non-immigrant workers in the first generation (1970) 
to 15 percent (2000) less than non-immigrant workers in the second 
generation, thereby making up more than half the deficit in wages earned 
by the first generation.
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Just as with non-immigrants, second generation immigrant wages 
are closely correlated with the first-generation’s income and education
levels. 
Wages of second generation immigrants are correlated to first generation 
immigrant wages in a similar manner to non-immigrant parents and children. 
l Based on 61 national origin groups, the correlation between first and second 
generation earnings in 1940 and 1970 is .42 for all immigrant workers 
(compared to .47 for non-immigrants). This means that approximately 
40 percent of the difference in relative economic status for immigrants from 
various nations passes to the second generation. 
Although immigrant groups show considerable economic mobility both up and 
down the income ladder in the second generation, the correlation between national
origin and income in the second generation is considerably diminished when 
education is taken into consideration.  
l This finding suggests that the likely pathway by which the correlation in 
wages is passed on through generations is through educational attainment. 
Immigrants entering the United States today are a diverse group, with
education levels varying greatly by country of origin.
As compared to the 1960s, the percentage of immigrants who are from 
European nations or Canada has declined, while the percentage from Asia, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean has increased from about half to nearly three
quarters of all incoming immigrants. 
Overall, the educational attainment of immigrants upon arrival in the United 
States has remained fairly constant. The proportion of immigrants with 
advanced degrees and those with a high school degree or less has stayed 
approximately the same since before 1970. However, the large net increase in 
immigration levels means that many more immigrants with low education enter 
the United States now than in the past. 
Educational attainment varies significantly based on an immigrant’s region 
of origin: almost half of immigrants from Latin America arrive with less than 
a high school diploma, while about half of immigrants from Asia arrive 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
E C O N O M I C  M O B I L I T Y  P R O J E C T : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
About half of the
difference in wages
attributable to
national origin 
are passed to the
second generation.
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Most economists believe thatimmigration, like trade, is on balance good for
America. But the term “on balance”
masks an important issue: whether
immigration, like trade, hurts some
Americans while helping others.
More specifically, what is the impact
of immigration on inequality and
economic mobility in America?
Trends in Immigration
Recent debate reflects that many
Americans are concerned about both
the scale and character of immigra-
tion to the United States. As Figure
1 shows, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, the number of legal
immigrants has been rising steadily
since the 1960s, from about 320,000
per year to nearly a million per year
in both the 1990s and 2000s. In
addition to these legal entrants, 
over 500,000 immigrants arrive or
remain illegally in the United States
each year.1 So, in recent years, a
total of about 1.5 million immigrants
have arrived in the United States
annually, more than a third of 
them illegally.2 One result of these
high immigration rates is that the
percentage of U.S. residents who 
are foreign-born increased from 4.7
percent in 1970 to 12.7 percent in
2003.3 Because many immigrants
tend to be in their prime child-bear-
ing years, and because they tend to
have more children than non-immi-
grants, the percentage of resident
children who have foreign-born 
parents is even higher, at about 
20 percent.4
In addition to major increases in 
the number of immigrants, the
source countries of immigrants 
have been changing. As compared
with the 1960s, the share of immi-
grants from European nations or
Canada has declined from about 
half to under 20 percent, while the
fraction from Asian, Latin American,
and Caribbean nations has increased
from about half to nearly three-
quarters.5 Relative to the average
American worker, immigrants from
Latin America and the Caribbean
are poorly educated, largely
unskilled, and earn low wages 
when they enter the United States.
Even so, the overall mix of educa-
tional attainment of immigrants
upon arrival in the United States 
has remained fairly constant over 
the last four decades. Figure 2 shows
that the proportion of immigrants
with a bachelor’s degree has actually
increased over the last 35 years; but
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otherwise the proportion of 
immigrants with advanced degrees
and those with a high school degree
or less has stayed approximately the
same since before 1970. In the last
four years, the percent of immigrants
with a bachelor’s degree or higher
has increased, while those with a 
high school diploma or less has
decreased. 
However, as seen in Figure 3, 
educational attainment varies 
significantly based on an immi-
grant’s region of origin. Educational
attainment for immigrants from
Latin America stands in stark 
contrast to the other regions of 
origin, with half arriving with less
than a high school diploma. By 
contrast, about half of immigrants
from Asia arrive with a bachelor’s
degree or higher. 
A major question regarding 
immigrant education is how their
educational attainment compares
with that of non-immigrants. Figure
4 provides such a comparison.6
The first set of bar graphs shows
that about six times as many first
generation immigrants, as compared
with non-immigrants, have less than
a ninth grade education. The second
set of bar graphs shows that first 
generation immigrants are also less
likely to have a high school degree. 
However, as shown in the last 
set of bar graphs, first generation 
immigrants are actually more likely
to have advanced degrees than 
non-immigrants. Clearly, the 
distribution of immigrants’ 
educational attainment is complex:
while nearly one third of recent
arrivals have less than a high school
diploma, more than 10 percent have
an advanced degree.
Another remarkable part of the
immigrant experience depicted in
Figure 4 is that second generation
immigrants exceed the educational
attainment of the first generation 
by a considerable margin.7 In the
case of advanced degrees (above 
the bachelor’s degree), they actually
exceed the attainment of both 
first generation immigrants and 
non-immigrants. As we will see, 
education is one vehicle that immi-
grants use to help their children 
get ahead. 
Further, education is one of the most
important determinants of wages 
and income in the United States. 
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According to the Census Bureau, in 
2005 high school graduates earned 
about $8,000 more than high school
dropouts, college graduates earned
about $19,000 more than high
school graduates with no college,
and those with professional degrees
earned about $36,000 more than
those with a bachelor’s degree.8
Immigrant Wages
Given the low educational 
attainment of a large number 
of immigrants, it is not surprising
that average immigrant wages are
low and falling relative to those of
non-immigrants. Figure 5, developed
from recent work by George Borjas
of Harvard University, shows 
the average hourly wages of first
generation immigrants relative to
non-immigrant workers in selected
years covering six decades. 
Relative wages of the first generation
show steady decline. In 1940 the
average first generation immigrant
earned 5.8 percent more than the 
average non-immigrant worker, but 
relative wages fell to only 1.4 
percent more in 1970, and then 
dropped precipitously by 2000 to
almost 20 percent less than those of
the typical non-immigrant worker.9
Figure 6 reveals another striking
wage pattern, already suggested by
the improved educational attainment
of second generation immigrants
illustrated in Figure 4: second gener-
ation immigrants not only exceed the
wages of first generation immigrants
but also exceed the wages of non-
immigrant workers. This pattern
demonstrates clearly that there 
is impressive upward economic
mobility from the first to the 
second immigrant generation.10
But before we conclude that the
great American wage escalator for
immigrants is working well, we
should note the pattern of relative
wages for the second generation
across the three time periods shown
in Figure 6.11 More specifically, 
relative wages of the second 
generation dropped consistently 
over the period from 17.8 percent 
to 6.3 percent above those of 
non-immigrant workers. Thus, the
pattern of declining relative wages 
of first generation immigrants is
associated with a similar pattern 
of declining relative wages in the
second generation. Second genera-
tion mobility is still in operation, 
but the second generation is earning
relative wages that are lower than 
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those of previous second generation
workers.
If the relative wages of both first and
second generation immigrants are
falling, the question arises: where
might this pattern lead in the future?
Figure 7 compares the relative wages
of first generation immigrants in
1940 and 1970 with wages of work-
ers in the second generation who are
in the same cohort as the children of
the respective 1940 and 1970 first
generation workers.12
The first set of bar graphs, for 
example, compares the relative
wages of the generation of foreign-
born workers who were in the 
United States in 1940 with the 
relative wages of second generation
workers who were in the United
States 30 years later and were
roughly the same age as the children
of the 1940 cohort of first generation
workers. Comparing the heights of
the bars shows that the second gen-
eration in 1970 exceeded the relative
wages of the parent-generation by
almost 9 percentage points. 
However, three decades later, the 
relative wages of second generation
workers were greater than those of
the 1970 first generation workers by
less than 5 percentage points. 
If the decline in second generation
relative wages continues apace with
the decline in first generation wages,
we can expect that second generation
workers in 2030 will earn substan-
tially less than non-immigrants just
as workers in their 2000 parent
cohort did. If low wages persist into
the second and subsequent genera-
tions for substantial numbers of
immigrants, economic hardship may
persist beyond the first generation
and assimilation into American 
society may become more difficult.
A contentious debate has emerged
over whether immigrants have an
impact on the wages or employment
levels of non-immigrants. The
respective sides in the debate are led
by Borjas, who argues that low-wage
immigrants have a negative impact
on poor non-immigrant workers,
especially blacks, and David Card 
of Berkeley who argues that they 
do not.13 The crux of the argument
for Card and economists who agree
with him is that immigrants not only 
supply labor, but they also consume
goods and services. It follows, based
on the economic theory of supply
and demand, that there is no inher-
ent reason why immigrants should
hurt non-immigrant workers. In a
word, the great American job
machine can accommodate millions
of immigrants because their con-
sumption will further stimulate the
economy and the job machine. 
Another important argument on
Card’s side of the debate is that 
the American economy needs immi-
grants. A recent report by Rob Paral
of the Immigration Policy Center
shows that immigrants are a major
presence in about one-third of U.S.
job categories and that most of these
job categories would have contracted
during the 1990s if it had not been
for immigrants.14 And as pointed 
out in a recent New York Times
Magazine feature about the Borjas-
Card debate, there are 21 million
immigrants who hold jobs in the
United States and only 7 million
unemployed workers.15 Thus, it 
cannot be the case that the over-
whelming majority of immigrants
took jobs away from Americans.
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But the real issue, responds Borjas, is
not the overall impact of immigrants
on the economy; the issue is their
impact on particular segments of the 
job market. Because recent years
have seen an increase in immigrants
(especially from Mexico) with 
low education and low skill levels
relative to those of non-immigrants,
the low-wage portion of the U.S. 
job market is disproportionately
affected. Card responds with data
showing that some cities with a large
influx of immigrants actually saw
increased wages at the bottom of 
the wage scale. 
The most recent entrant in this
ongoing and lively argument is a
study published this year by Borjas
along with his colleagues Jeffrey
Grogger of the University of Chicago
and Gordon Hanson of the
University of California at San
Diego, based on 40 years of U.S.
Census Bureau data.16 Examining
the census employment data within
skill groups and controlling for a
number of factors that might affect
their results, the authors found that
“as immigrants disproportionately
increased the supply of workers in a 
particular skill group, the wage of
black workers in that group fell, the
employment rate declined, and the
incarceration rate rose.” Linking
immigrants with both black unem-
ployment levels and incarceration
rates, already delicate topics among
scholars and policy makers, is likely
to raise the volume of the Borjas-
Card debate. 
When economists who are greatly
respected by their colleagues 
disagree sharply over an issue 
like the impact of immigration on
employment and wages, it seems
wise for outsiders to resist forming 
a strong conclusion and simply 
say, instead, that the jury is still 
out. Thus, we make no claims 
about whether immigrants have an
impact on the wages of low skilled
non-immigrants.
Impacts of Immigration 
on Inequality
Given that average relative wages 
of immigrants are falling, it seems
likely that immigrants are contribut-
ing to widening income inequality in
the United States. But as Robert
Lerman of American University has
argued, this standard view of the
impact of immigrants on inequality
is somewhat misleading because it
ignores the impact of immigration on
the economic status of immigrants 
themselves.17 Economists typically
measure growth in income inequality
by comparing some measure of the
distribution of income at two points
in time. These calculations invari-
ably reveal that the growing income
inequality in the United States is
aggravated by the declining wages of
each succeeding wave of immigrants.
However, because these calculations
are based on random samples of the
U.S. population at two points in
time, they ignore the condition of
immigrants before they arrived in
the United States. Because of the
rapid increase in immigration, the
more recent sample will include
more immigrants than earlier sam-
ples. Moreover, because immigrants
are increasingly from low-wage
countries like Mexico, the immi-
grants selected in the more current
sample will have, on average, lower
education levels and lower relative
wages than immigrants in the earlier
sample. Thus, immigrants contribute
to the growing economic inequality
in the United States. 
E C O N O M I C  M O B I L I T Y  P R O J E C T : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
Falling Relative Wages of First 
and Second Generation Workers
5.8%
1.4%
-19.7%
14.6%
6.3%
?
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1st Generation     2nd Generation 1st Generation     2nd Generation
1st Generation     2nd Generation
(1940)     (1970) (1970)     (2000)
(2000)            (2030)
Source: Borjas, 2006, p. 59.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
W
ag
e 
D
if
fe
re
nt
ia
l
FIGURE 7
I M M I G R AT I O N : Wages, Education And Mobility5
But Lerman’s point is that if we had
a measure of the new immigrants’
wages in their native country, we
would find that, on average, they
have greatly improved their wages
by entering the United States. The
economist Mark Rosenzweig, for
example, has recently estimated that
Mexican workers with a high school
degree earn seven times as much in
the United States as in Mexico.18
Lerman recommends calculating 
the impact of the American economy
on changes in measures of economic
well-being and inequality by 
including estimates of the income
immigrants would have received in
their home country.19 According to
Lerman, such a calculation reveals
that the growth of income inequality
is about two-thirds less than it would
have been if the income immigrants
would have earned in their home
country had been ignored. 
Immigrant Mobility
By considering immigrants’ income
before they enter the country we
may conclude that the American
economy provides a huge boost 
to the mobility of first generation
immigrants. Indeed, this conclusion
is consistent with the most basic
rationale of immigration between
nations throughout human history;
namely, that the prospect of greater
economic opportunity is a prime
motivator of immigration. 
But what about the mobility of
immigrants from various nations 
and their children once they reach
the United States? To examine 
this question, we turn again to the
seminal work of Borjas, who has
developed a useful method for exam-
ining the intergenerational mobility
of immigrant groups from various
nations. First, he computes the 
relative wages (again, relative to
non-immigrant workers) of male
immigrants from selected nations 
in 1970 based on U.S. Census
Bureau data. Then he repeats the
computation for second generation
immigrants 30 years later for the
same national origin groups. Table 
1 compares the results for both 
generations of immigrants from
selected countries.20 
Borjas finds that immigrant groups
from industrialized nations tended to
earn more than average non-immi-
grant workers. Immigrants from
France, for example, earned 19.8
percent more than average non-
immigrant workers. By the second
generation in 2000, the relative
wages of workers from industrialized
nations had moved closer to the
average of non-immigrant workers.
In other words, they experienced
downward relative mobility in the
second generation. 
By contrast, first generation immi-
grants from less industrialized coun-
tries earned less than typical non-
immigrant workers. For example,
immigrants from Mexico earned
almost 32 percent less than non-
immigrants in 1970. Thirty years
later, second generation workers
from less industrialized nations had
also moved closer to the average
wages of non-immigrant workers, 
but in this case by rising above 
relative first generation wages. 
In the case of second generation
immigrants from Mexico, for 
example, their relative wages moved
from 32 percent less than non-immi-
grant workers in the first generation
to only 15 percent less than non-
immigrant workers in the second
generation. With few exceptions, first
Age-Adjusted Relative Wages of Immigrants from Selected Countries
Country of Origin
Relative Wage of 
Immigrants 
in 1970
Relative Wage of 
Second Generation 
in 2000
Wage Improvement or 
Decline in Second Generation
 (Percentage Points)
Canada 18.5 16.8 -1.7
France 19.8 5.9 -13.9
India 30.8 27.1 -3.7
Germany 24.9 19.5 -5.4
Dominican Republic -37.0 -18.9 18.1
Haiti -21.7 10.6 32.3
Mexico -31.6 -14.7 16.9
Jamaica -22.8 1.2 24.0
Source: Borjas, 2006, p62
table 1
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generation immigrants from various
nations start at different levels in the
U.S. wage distribution and second
generation workers from the respec-
tive nations show wage mobility by
moving in the direction of mean
wages—moving down if the first
generation had wages above the
mean and moving up if the first gen-
eration had wages below the mean.
Despite the considerable movement
of wages between first and second
generation immigrants, the question
arises of whether the characteristics
of first generation immigrants 
influence the wages of the second
generation. To examine the relation-
ship between the wages of first 
and second generation immigrants,
Borjas computes the intergenera-
tional correlation between the 
relative wages of first generation
workers from selected nations and
those of second generation workers
from the same nations. 
He finds that, based on 30 national
origin groups, the intergenerational
correlation between the 1940 
and 1970 generations is .42. The
correlation between the 1970 and
2000 cohorts, based on 61 national
origin groups is similar.21 These 
correlations across generations are
comparable to those reported for
native-born American families. In
other words, non-immigrants and
immigrants pass along approximately
the same degree of economic 
advantage or disadvantage to their
children. In common sense terms,
according to Borjas, correlations 
of this magnitude mean that about
40 percent of the wage differences
between any two national groups in
the first generation persists into the
second generation.
But what happens to these correla-
tions if they are adjusted for the
education level of the various 
national groups? Borjas finds that
the correlations in wages between
the first and second generations 
are considerably diminished when
adjusted for the education level of
the various national groups. This
finding suggests that one pathway
by which the correlation in wages is
passed on through the generations
among the national groups is 
educational achievement. Given 
the low educational achievement 
of many immigrants now arriving 
in the United States, it might be
expected that average wages in the
second generation will continue to
drop in the future.
Although today’s immigrant 
population is arriving with a mix 
of educational backgrounds that 
are similar to the mix of earlier
immigrants, the increase in the
absolute number of immigrants 
with low levels of education, coupled
with the relatively high correlation
between the wages of first and 
second generation immigrants, 
suggest that it may be increasingly
difficult for second generation 
immigrants to surpass the wages 
of non-immigrants. First generation
immigrants certainly experience 
economic mobility by coming to the
United States, but the mobility of
second generation immigrants is 
constrained by the characteristics 
of first generation immigrants that
are passed to second generation
immigrants, primarily education.
Conclusion
It is a remarkable achievement, 
considering the low wages immi-
grants would have made in their
own countries, that America offers
such rich opportunities for immi-
grants to improve their income and
standard of living. Further, second
generation immigrants continue 
to earn more than first generation
immigrants, though wages of second
generation immigrants have been
falling relative to those of non-immi-
grants over the last three genera-
tions. Moreover, the economic
prospects of second generation
immigrants are very much tied to
the characteristics of first generation
immigrants, most notably to level of
educational attainment. 
Economic assimilation appears to be
working well, although the country
is now in the process of incorporat-
ing a distinctly different, and 
lower-wage, immigrant population
from that of previous generations.
With wages in the United States
strongly correlated to both education
levels and to parental incomes, 
the children of low-wage, poorly
educated immigrants may well 
have an uphill climb to continue
reaching economic parity with 
non-immigrants.  
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NOTES
1. Martin and Midgley, 2006, p. 3. Most researchers who have tried to estimate the number of illegal entrants or the total number of illegal residents who live in
the U.S. at any given moment would agree that it is impossible to get an exact count. Even so, some estimates are more reasonable than others. Most observers
seem to agree that the most reliable numbers have been produced by Jeffrey Passel (2006) of the Pew Hispanic Center in Washington, D.C. Martin and Midgley
use Passel’s estimates. Although it receives little attention, the United States also has emigration. The Census Bureau estimates that between 1995 and 1997,
220,000 foreign-born residents emigrated to other countries each year. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2004. 
2. All data presented in this report, unless otherwise noted, are based on analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey that includes both legal
and illegal immigrants in the sample. However, the survey does not allow researchers to identify the legal status of immigrants and therefore cannot be used to
analyze legal versus illegal immigrants.
3. Borjas, 2006. 
4. Non-immigrants include residents of the United States who are third generation immigrants, as well as generations subsequent to the third generaion.
Reardon-Anderson, Capps, and Fix, 2006.
5. Martin and Midgley, 2006.
6. As noted above, non-immigrants include residents of the United States who are third generation immigrants, as well as generations subsequent to the third
generation.
7. During each of the years shown in Figures 4 through 7, the Census Bureau interviewed random samples of people residing in the United States. Because the
interviews of first and generation immigrants were conducted during the same year, the second generation in each year cannot represent the children’s genera-
tion of first generation immigrants. However, as shown in Figure 7, it is possible to compare the first generation in a given year with the second generation sev-
eral decades later to gain a rough idea of how the offspring cohort of the earlier cohort of first generation immigrants are doing.  
8. U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, “Educational Attainment in the United States, 2006: Detailed Tables,” Table 8.
9. The data points in Figure 5 are log wage differentials multiplied by 100 to convert them to percentages. Borjas and Friedberg (2006) show that the relative
wages of immigrants have increased somewhat in the last half of the 1990s due primarily to an increase in highly-educated immigrants such as engineers and
doctors and to a decline in the wages of non-immigrant workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, primarily high school dropouts.
10. Given that the years between 1940 and 2000 saw significant changes in the relative education, country of origin, and other characteristics of immigrants, the
wage differences between first and second generation immigrants in Figures 5 through 7 reflect many differences between the two samples.
11. The data points in Figure 6 are log wage differentials multiplied by 100 to convert them to percentages.
12. Workers in the sample of second generation workers are not the actual children of the particular individuals in the first generation sample. In the year they
were interviewed they were roughly the same age as children of first generation workers. The data points in Figure 7 are log wage differentials multiplied by
100 to convert them to percentages.
13. Card and Lewis, 2007.
14. Paral, 2005.
15. Lowenstein, 2006.
16. Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2006.
17. Lerman, 1999; Lerman, 2003. 
18. Rosenzweig, 2006. There appears to be some disagreement among economists about these U.S.-Mexican wage differentials. Gordon Hanson (2006), for exam-
ple, has estimated that the wages of Mexican high school graduates who come to the United States are around three times greater than the wages of high school
graduates who stay in Mexico. Even so, there is no disagreement that by moving to the United States, Mexicans and other workers from Latin American nations
(and most other nations as well) can greatly increase their wages.
19. Lerman’s approach involves estimating immigrants’ income at time 1 in relation to average income in their country adjusted for education and other individ-
ual characteristics. As his measure of inequality in the United States, Lerman uses Census Bureau data to compute the ratio of incomes at the 10th percentile to
incomes at the 90th percentile; lower ratios indicate higher income inequality. For all families, the traditional approach of ignoring the income of immigrants at
time 1 (in this case 1979) yields a Gini coefficient of .299 at time 1 and .344 at time 2 (1997), representing a substantial increase in inequality. By contrast,
using Lerman’s method of estimating what the income of immigrants would have been in their home country at time 1 reveals that the Gini coefficient at time 1
was .329, only slightly lower than the .344 at time 2.
20. The data in Table 1 show a clear pattern of what statisticians call “regression to the mean.” This term simply means that if the parent’s generation has scores
above or below the population mean, scores of the children’s generation would tend to be closer to the mean. Thus, we would expect the relative wages of second
generation workers from selected countries to be closer to the mean of all workers than the relative wages of the parent’s generation. The probability of regres-
sion to the mean increases as average relative wages in the parent generation depart further from the mean of all workers. The countries presented in Table 1
are selected from a larger set of countries studied by Borjas. Not all the countries in Borjas’s samples show regression to the mean.
21. Borjas, 2006, p. 64.
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